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Business CyberSecurity

She Thought It Was From Her Boss

It was a Tuesday morning. Nothing unusual.

Sarah handled the accounts for a small business in Hertfordshire. Twelve employees, decent turnover, the kind of company that runs on trust and familiarity. She’d worked there for six years.

At 9:14am, an email arrived from the managing director.

It asked her to process an urgent payment to a new supplier. £14,200. The company had been expecting to bring on new contractors, so it wasn’t out of context. The email had his name. His usual sign-off. The tone was exactly right.

She processed the payment.

At 11:30am, the MD walked past her desk and asked how her morning was going. She mentioned the payment. He had no idea what she was talking about.

The email hadn’t come from him.

The money was gone.

What actually happened

This type of attack is called Business Email Compromise, or BEC. It doesn’t involve malware, hacked systems, or anything technically impressive. The attacker simply registered a domain that looked almost identical to the company’s real one. One letter different. Easy to miss when you’re not looking for it.

They’d done their research too. LinkedIn told them who the MD was. The company website told them enough about the business to make the email convincing. The rest was timing and confidence.

Sarah hadn’t done anything stupid. She’d done what most people would do. She trusted an email that looked completely legitimate, from someone she worked with every day, about something that fitted into normal business operations.

That’s exactly why it worked.

This isn’t rare

BEC fraud costs UK businesses hundreds of millions of pounds every year. It’s one of the most financially damaging types of cybercrime, and it almost never makes the news because the businesses it hits are too small to be newsworthy and too embarrassed to talk about it.

It works on small businesses specifically because small businesses run on trust. There’s less process, fewer approval steps, and more reliance on people just getting things done. Attackers know this.

Three things that would have stopped it

None of these are complicated. None require significant investment.

What happened to Sarah

She wasn’t fired. The MD understood that she’d been deceived, not negligent. But the money was gone and the relationship between them was never quite the same. That’s the part that doesn’t show up in the fraud statistics.

The business recovered. Not every business does.

If you want to know whether your current setup would have caught this, get in touch. It’s usually a quick conversation.

James
Attenu8 IT Support

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